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Introduction
Borders influence the scope of local governments' policies such as setting tax rates and providing public goods. Borders may also influence the location of businesses. Firms that do not locate in the core of the city, but rather at the border, may choose between two or more municipalities with different administrative bodies. When customers' demand or public infrastructure is similar at both sides of the border, the firm will choose the municipality that provides a more attractive bundle of tax rates and public services. If the core of a city is more attractive to firms as compared to the outskirts, tax competition is likely to be stronger the closer the border of a city is drawn around its core. The surrounding municipalities may well participate in the core's benefits (such as the high density of consumers) and may offer low tax rates when the core's infrastructure can be co-used. With a wide border, by contrast, the city can tax its benefits of agglomeration away, which gives rise to less tax competition.
Using data for German municipalities, I investigate whether the spatial administrative structure of agglomerations is associated with local business tax rates in core cities of agglomerations. The local business tax ("Gewerbesteuer") is one of the most effective economic measures employed by local politicians. I define agglomerations based on distances and based on cumulative population densities. The results show that the population share of the core in its agglomeration is positively associated and the number of surrounding municipalities is negatively associated with the tax rate of the core. When municipalities consolidate, the core has the opportunity to increase the tax rate.
Tax Competition and the Role of Borders
Many studies investigate how jurisdictions engage in tax competition. The seminal paper by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) shows that jurisdictions competing for a mobile factor (capital) set inefficiently low tax rates. When the number of competing jurisdictions increases, the mobility of capital increases. A race to the bottom in the levels of taxation and public good provision occurs; the positive externality of a tax increase on the neighboring jurisdictions is neglected (see also Hoyt, 1991; 1 Wildasin, 1989; and Wilson, 1986) . 1 When demand for public goods is allowed to differ between jurisdictions, high-demand jurisdictions have been shown to have higher tax rates and lower capital stocks than low-demand jurisdictions; the demand for public goods thus mitigates the pressure to reduce tax rates (Brueckner, 2000 and . Asymmetry in jurisdictions' size has been shown to influence tax competition. With two equal jurisdictions, the smaller jurisdiction has been shown to set a lower tax rate than the larger jurisdiction (Bucovetsky, 1991; and Wilson, 1991 ; see also Haufler and Wooton, 1999) .
In reaction-function models, experts empirically explain tax rates by the spatial interaction in jurisdictions' tax-setting behavior. In alternative models, the spatial administrative structure describes the degree of competition. Decentralization as measured, for example, by the number of municipalities may well reduce the size of the public sector by taming the leviathan. In the United States, decentralization has been shown to reduce the size of the public sector (Sjoquist, 1982; Nelson, 1987; and Zax, 1989) . The results by Oates (1985) , however, do not show that decentralization influences the size of the public sector. In German counties, local business taxation has been higher when the number of municipalities has been small (Buettner, 1999) . In the German state Baden-Wuerttemberg, local business taxation has increased in the population size. The tax rate of a municipality has been influenced by neighboring municipalities' tax rates (Buettner, 2001 ). The tax base has reacted negatively to the own tax rate; the results do, however, not show that the tax base has reacted to the tax rates of neighboring municipalities (Buettner, 2003) . In the Canadian province British Columbia, tax rates have also been influenced by neighboring municipalities' tax rates (Brett and Pinkse, 2000) . In Italy and the Boston metropolitan area, governments have interacted strategically in property taxation (Bordignon et al., 2003; and Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001 ). 2
The role of borders has also been examined in contexts other than taxation. In the United States, for example, the number of public school districts in metropolitan areas has been shown to increase the quality of schooling (Hoxby, 2000) . Income growth has been higher in metropolitan areas that host many county governments (Hatfield and Kosec, 2013) . How the spatial administrative structure is associated with local business tax rates remains as an empirical question. 3
German Municipalities and Taxation
The tax system in Germany allows both the federal government and the municipalities to tax business income. While the federal government taxes corporations with the corporate tax and sole proprietors and partnerships with the income tax, the municipalities decide upon the rate of the local business tax (which applies to corporations, sole proprietors, and partnerships). Sole proprietors and partnerships can credit the local business tax partly against the income tax. The local business tax is the most important autonomously determined source of revenue for German municipalities.
In the average city the local business tax generated about 52 percent of tax revenues in 2007. 4 The local business tax has a lower bound of 10 percent for corporations, but no upper bound. There were 12,263 municipalities in Germany in 2007. After the German reunification in 1990 the number of municipalities in East Germany declined, while the number of municipalities remained fairly constant in other parts of the country. The municipal structure differs a great deal among 3 Borders may well influence tax competition in an international context: in the French-German border region, local business tax competition has been present between municipalities within a country, but not across the country border (Cassette et al., 2012) . In Germany, local politicians have perceived competition independent of state or country borders (Geys and Osterloh, 2013) . 4 The ratio of local business tax revenues to total tax revenues was highest in the city of Salzgitter at 71 percent. The city of Wolfsburg had negative revenues due to high tax refunds.
the German states ("Bundesländer"). Figure 1 shows the number of municipalities per 100 square kilometers. The state of Rhineland-Palatinate, for example, has 2,306 municipalities but the state of North Rhine-Westphalia has only 396, though North Rhine-Westphalia has a larger area.
Agglomerations and Empirical Strategy
I define agglomerations around all cities that are independent of counties ("Kreisfreie Städte").
In 2007 there were 118 county-independent cities. 6 I focus on county-independent cities as core cities of agglomerations, because they represent Germany's largest cities being regional centers.
A clear-cut definition of agglomerations does not exist. I use two different approaches to define agglomerations: my first approach is based on the proximity of municipalities to a core city, my second approach focuses on population densities.
In the first approach, I define an agglomeration as consisting of the core city and all surrounding municipalities within a certain distance (of 15, 25, or 50 km) to the core city (see Figure 3) .
To measure the (linear) distance between municipalities, I rely on the geographical coordinates of municipalities' official central points. The central points are well-defined in Germany and are typically very central places in the municipalities' centers. To define an agglomeration in the second approach, I sort the surrounding municipalities according to their distance to the core. Starting from the core, I add municipalities -with increasing distances -until the cumulative population density from the core to the respective municipality no longer changes significantly (see Figure 4 ; a more detailed explanation follows in Section 5). Agglomerations' area differs from city to city in the second approach, while agglomerations' area is (almost) the same for all cities in the first approach. In both approaches agglomerations can overlap. 7 6 County-independent cities are not associated with a county, but are directly subordinate to their state. A county-dependent city, by contrast, is part of a county, which is at an intermediate stage between city and state. I also consider the cities of Hanover and Saarbrücken as county-independent cities, although their legal status deviates slightly ("Kommunalverband besonderer Art"). One may exclude the city states (Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen), which form a city and a state at the same time, because city states have more responsibilities than other cities. While Berlin and Hamburg (that consist of only one city) are dropped because of collinearity, the results are not sensitive to excluding Bremen (that consists of two cities).
7 As an alternative approach, I also considered the so-called "BIK regions". The concept of BIK regions (provided by BIK ASCHPURWIS+BEHRENS) is based on Boustedt (1953) , who in turn took the US concept of "Standard To describe how agglomerations differ, I use two kinds of indicators: the position of the core city relative to the surrounding municipalities, and the structure of the surrounding municipalities. I measure the position of the core city relative to the surrounding municipalities by the population of the core city relative to the total population in the agglomeration. This "share of core" aims at measuring the "power" of the core in the agglomeration. To measure the structure of the surrounding municipalities, I consider two alternative variables: the number of surrounding municipalities and the population per surrounding municipality. The structure of the surrounding municipalities is included with a view to measuring competition from the surrounding municipalities. Table 1 shows the ten largest German cities and their agglomerations defined with a radius of 50 km around the city.
As a robustness test, I also consider the Herfindahl index of the agglomerations' fragmentation in population figures. The Herfindahl index assumes large values (up to 1) when a city has a large population share in its agglomeration, and when the number of surrounding municipalities is small.
It is conceivable that tax rates are higher in agglomerations because of "agglomeration rents", as formulated in the New-Economic-Geography literature (see Krugman, 1993) . Firms may exploit economies of scale by producing in a small number of locations. Firms may locate in agglomerations to reduce transport costs, both to customers and from input suppliers. These positive externalities give rise to higher profits in agglomerations, with agglomeration forces being "strongest for intermediate trade cost, i.e., when trade costs are low enough to make agglomeration possible yet high enough to make it worthwhile" (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004: 22) . The agglomeration rents that cities can tax away follow the "bell-shaped link between trade costs and agglomeration". 8
Public expenditure (per capita) may be higher in large cities because the inhabitants of large cities have a higher demand for public goods (Popitz, 1932) . Population density and public expenditure may be positively related because of the size disadvantages of large cities (Brecht, 1932) 
. Experts
Metropolitan Areas" (SMA) as a model. According to the BIK-regions concept agglomerations are formed by those surrounding municipalities in which a certain share of the population is commuting to the core city. The empirical results with the BIK-regions concept are similar to the empirical results in the two other approaches.
elaborate on a U-shaped relationship with decreasing per-capita expenditure up to an optimal municipality size or density (economies of scale) and increasing per-capita expenditure afterwards (congestion externalities). 9 Per-capita expenditure and tax rates should thus be higher the larger the population or the population density of the core or the whole agglomeration becomes. Since congestion externalities in the city are not only caused by inhabitants of the city, but also by inhabitants of the surrounding area, I focus on the whole agglomeration (which includes the core) when controlling for the population. 10 Because the data in both approaches to defining agglomerations indicate a positive correlation between population and population density (the correlation coefficient is between 0.38 and 0.99), I only include population as control variable.
To capture the intensity of tax competition between cities, I include the distance to the next countyindependent city as control variable. 11 To describe expenditure needs, I include unemployment per 1000 capita and the level of public debt per 1000 capita. 12 To describe budget conditions, I include revenues from other taxes per 1000 capita (including property taxes, municipal share of income tax, and municipal share of value added tax). To describe preferences, I include the share of the population aged 18 and younger and the share of the population aged 65 and older. To account for ideology-induced policy making, I include a variable describing the party affiliation of the mayor, which assumes the value one for a left-wing mayor (from the Social Democrats or the Greens), the value zero for a right-wing mayor (from the Christian Democrats or the Free Democrats), and the value 0.5 for a mayor without party affiliation. 13 Local business tax rates depend on the state a municipality belongs to (see Figure 2 ). One reason for the different levels of taxation may be the different fiscal equalization schemes in the states, 9 For empirical evidence of a U-shaped relationship regarding population densities see Ladd (1992) for the United States and Seitz (2002) for Germany. All of my observations are above the optimal size of jurisdictions because I only include core cities of agglomerations.
10 The surrounding municipalities co-use the infrastructure and hence may also cause taxes in the city to be higher.
11 Janeba and Osterloh (2013) examine competition on two levels: cities compete with smaller neighboring municipalities and more distant cities; small municipalities only compete with other municipalities in their neighborhood.
12 In the United States, redistributive politics have been shown to influence the tax policies of large cities (Inman, 1989) .
13 Using the ideology of the majority in the city council instead of the ideology of the mayor does not change the inferences. On ideology-induced policy making in Germany see, for example, Potrafke (2011 Potrafke ( , 2012 Potrafke ( , and 2013 6 which redistribute between the municipalities to different degrees. The state of Hesse, for example, balances only 50 percent of the difference between "fiscal need" and "fiscal capacity" of a municipality (if positive), the state of North Rhine-Westphalia balances 90 percent of this difference. There are thus significant differences in the share of an additional Euro of revenue that a municipality can keep. I include state fixed effects (based on the state of the core city) because of the resulting different incentives in setting tax rates. 14 The regression equation is:
Local business tax rate
Share of core i describes the population share of the core city, Surrounding municipalities i describes the number of surrounding municipalities or the population per surrounding municipality, X i describes a vector of control variables (including population of the agglomeration, distance to the next county-independent city, unemployment per 1000 capita, level of public debt per 1000 capita, revenues from other taxes per 1000 capita, shares of the young and the old population, mayor ideology, and state dummies), and u i is the error term. I estimate an OLS model with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity (Huber/White/sandwich standard errors -see Huber, 1967; and White, 1980) . 
Empirical Results

First Approach (Based on Distances)
The left part of Table 5 shows the results for agglomerations with a radius of 15 km. Column (1) shows that the effect of the share of the core city lacks statistical significance. When the number of municipalities and hence the number of competitors increases by 100 percent, the tax rate decreases 14 It is worth noting that the share of an additional Euro of revenue that a municipality can keep is also influenced by other factors, such as the rate that is applied to normalize revenues. For how fiscal equalization transfers influence tax policy, see Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) , Buettner (2006) , Egger et al. (2010), and Köthenbürger (2002) .
15 I do not use clustered standard errors due to the scarcity of available clusters.
by 0.60 percentage points. The effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Column (2) shows that when the share of the core city increases from 0 to 100 percent, the tax rate increases by 2.43 percentage points. The effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. When the population per surrounding municipality increases by 100 percent, the tax rate increases by 0.67 percentage points. The effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The effect results from the declining number of competitors because of the larger surrounding municipalities. Column (3) shows that the effect of the Herfindahl index does not turn out to be statistically significant.
When the population of the agglomeration increases by 100 percent, the tax rate significantly increases by 1.19 to 1.34 percentage points (columns 1 and 3) . When the level of public debt per 1000 capita increases by 100 percent, the tax rate significantly increases by 0.20 to 0.22 percentage points. When the share of the young population increases from 0 to 100 percent, the tax rate significantly decreases by 16.43 to 21.35 percentage points. The effects of the distance to the next county-independent city, unemployment per 1000 capita, revenues from other taxes per 1000 capita, share of the old population, and mayor ideology lack statistical significance. The right part of Table 5 shows the results for agglomerations with a radius of 25 km. Column (4) shows that when the share of the core city increases from 0 to 100 percent, the tax rate increases by 2.56 percentage points. The effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. When the number of municipalities increases by 100 percent, the tax rate decreases by 1.00 percentage points.
The effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Column (5) shows that when the share of the core city increases from 0 to 100 percent, the tax rate increases by 4.15 percentage points.
The effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. When the population per surrounding municipality increases by 100 percent, the tax rate increases by 1.05 percentage points. The effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Column (6) shows that the effect of the Herfindahl index does not turn out to be statistically significant. When the population of the agglomeration increases by 100 percent, the tax rate significantly increases by 1.24 to 1.53 percentage points (columns 4 and 6). When the level of public debt per 1000 capita increases by 100 percent, the tax rate significantly increases by 0.26 percentage points (columns 4 and 5). When the share of the young population increases from 0 to 100 percent, the tax rate significantly decreases by 18.54 to 26.87 percentage points. The effects of the distance to the next county-independent city, unemployment per 1000 capita, revenues from other taxes per 1000 capita, share of the old population, and mayor ideology lack statistical significance. Table 6 shows the results for agglomerations with a radius of 50 km. As compared to agglomerations of 25 km, the effect of the share of the core has increased. A large share in a widely defined agglomeration thus gives rise to a stronger position of the core than a large share in a narrowly defined agglomeration. Also the effect of the number of surrounding municipalities or the population per surrounding municipality has increased. Considering also municipalities located far away does thus not reduce the effect of the surrounding municipalities' structure on the tax rate of the core. 16 The positive and statistically significant effect of the Herfindahl index confirms that a city with a large population share in its agglomeration and few (and thus large) competitors charge higher tax rates. The effect of the population of the agglomeration has become smaller, because the broader definition of agglomerations also covers population from far away. The effect of the level of public debt per 1000 capita is statistically significant (columns 1 and 2). The share of the young population is also statistically significant. When the share of the old population increases from 0 to 100 percent, the tax rate significantly decreases by 16.17 percentage points (column 3). Inferences do not change when all control variables unrelated to the administrative structure are excluded (unemployment per 1000 capita, the level of public debt per 1000 capita, revenues from other taxes per 1000 capita, the shares of the young and the old population, and mayor ideology; see columns 4-6).
Second Approach (Based on Population Densities)
I now focus on population densities to define agglomerations. I rank surrounding municipalities according to their distance to the core. I add municipalities from this list to the core until the cumulative population density of the resulting agglomeration remains roughly constant. I stop adding municipalities when the cumulative population density from the core to some surrounding municipality n exceeds the cumulative population density from the core to the surrounding municipality n + 20 by no more than q percent (with q = 1, 10). 17 This approach captures the "agglomeration 16 Ohsawa (1999) examines how the location of administrative bodies influences commodity tax competition.
17 I also used a different span (n + 10) and different values for q (2, 5). The larger the span and the smaller q, the larger the agglomerations. The empirical results confirm the results in this section.
mountain" that rises from the flat country (see again Figure 4). 18
The left part of Table 7 shows the results for q = 10. When the share of the core city increases from 0 to 100 percent, the tax rate increases by 2.79 to 4.64 percentage points. The effects are statistically significant at the 5 percent and 1 percent level. When the number of surrounding municipalities (the population per surrounding municipality) increases by 100 percent, the tax rate decreases by 0.83 (increases by 0.92) percentage points. The effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The Herfindahl index confirms these results. When the population of the agglomeration increases by 100 percent, the tax rate significantly increases by 0.92 to 1.75 percentage points. The effect of the level of public debt per 1000 capita is statistically significant (columns 1 and 2). The share of the young population is also statistically significant.
The right part of Table 7 shows the results for q = 1. The agglomerations are now larger, because a smaller decline in the cumulative population density is required. The effect of the core city's share is thus slightly larger than before. When the share of the core city increases from 0 to 100 percent, Based on column (1) of Table 6 , I predict the tax rates of individual German cities that would result if these cities had the average administrative structure of the ten largest German cities (compare Table 1 ). Stuttgart and Frankfurt, for example, are currently exposed to strong tax competition.
With the average administrative structure of the ten largest German cities, Stuttgart and Frankfurt were able to increase their tax rates by about 1.7 and 1.3 percentage points as compared to the predicted tax rates with the current administrative structure. Munich, a city less exposed to tax competition, would have to reduce its tax rate by about 1.0 percentage points. The population share of the core city influences the effects more than the number of surrounding municipalities.
Conclusion
I investigate whether the spatial administrative structure of agglomerations is associated with local business tax rates in core cities of agglomerations. Using data for German municipalities, I define agglomerations based on distances and based on cumulative population densities. The results show that the population share of the core in its agglomeration is positively associated and the number of surrounding municipalities is negatively associated with the tax rate of the core. 19 The administrative structure of an agglomeration is thus an important determinant of tax policy in the core. When municipalities consolidate, the core has the opportunity to increase the tax rate.
Cities with "narrow" borders may suffer from tax competition because of the positive externalities of their public goods. 20 Surrounding municipalities co-use the core city's infrastructure without paying for it and may thus attract firms with low tax rates. Being exposed to this "externalitybased" tax competition, the core city also sets a lower tax rate. The results support a consolidation policy because the consolidation internalizes the positive externality from the core city to the surrounding municipality. With less externality-based tax competition the core city may then set a higher tax rate. 21 This core city's higher tax rate does not describe a leviathan municipality (with a tax rate increasing above the optimal level), but rather a tax rate that approaches the optimal tax rate from below. Predicting the effects of reforming administrative structures shows that this would have significant effects on the local business tax rate. In the second approach I add municipalities (displayed at the abscissa with increasing distance to the core) to the agglomeration until the cumulative population density (from the core to the respective municipality) remains "roughly" constant (dashed line; technical details in Section 5). While the decline in cumulative population density at a is still too large, the decline is sufficiently small at b. The agglomeration (Munich) includes 268 municipalities. The first column shows the population of the respective city, the second column the population of the municipalities within a circle of 50 km (including the core), the third column the population share of the core in its agglomeration, the fourth column the number of municipalities within a circle of 50 km (excluding the core), the fifth column the population per surrounding municipality, the sixth column the Herfindahl index of the agglomeration, and the seventh column the local business tax rate of the core. Agglomerations include core and surrounding municipalities. Tax rate in percent, population figures (including unemployment) in 1000 inhabitants, distance in kilometers, and debt and other revenues in Euro. Table without Berlin, Hamburg, and Saarbrücken (missing due to collinearity; there is only one city in each of these states). Agglomerations include core and surrounding municipalities. Tax rate in percent, population figures (including unemployment) in 1000 inhabitants, distance in kilometers, and debt and other revenues in Euro. Table without Berlin, Hamburg, and Saarbrücken (missing due to collinearity; there is only one city in each of these states). Agglomerations include core and surrounding municipalities. Tax rate in percent, population figures (including unemployment) in 1000 inhabitants, distance in kilometers, and debt and other revenues in Euro. Table without Berlin, Hamburg, and Saarbrücken (missing due to collinearity; there is only one city in each of these states). and Saarbrücken are missing due to collinearity (there is only one city in each of these states). and Saarbrücken are missing due to collinearity (there is only one city in each of these states). and Saarbrücken are missing due to collinearity (there is only one city in each of these states).
